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ABSTRACT 
 
Political instability causes the widespread loss of income for nearly all subpopulations 
of a country. However, it is not the case that all people lose a constant share of their 
income. Using a case of political instability in Madagascar that caused incredible 
disruption to the economy, I analyze the effect of political instability on two groups, 
women and the well educated. I find that women are more vulnerable to income loss 
and that this may be the reason political instability leads to worse human development 
indices than would be predicted solely by income. I also find the well-educated have 
some form of coping mechanism that allows them to better assess the economic 
environment and find a way to maintain their labor income. 
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Introduction 
 Political instability (PI) in the developing world, particularly Africa, is an 
unfortunately common scourge that causes great destruction of human life, physical 
infrastructure, and economic productivity. With people potentially losing their 
livelihoods following PI, there will naturally be widespread income loss. However, 
there is no reason to conclude that every person will lose the same proportion of his or 
her income. Taking subpopulations of interest and determining whether they fared 
relatively well or relatively poorly following the PI can inform us about the nature of 
their employment. 
 Using a coup d’état that occurred in December 2001 in Madagascar as the 
instance of PI, this paper generally examines the effects of the instability on women 
and people with high levels of education. 
 It has already been demonstrated that PI leads to a greater drop in human 
development indices than would be expected based solely on aggregate income loss. 
In this paper, I show that the intermediate link between PI and the unexplained 
development gap is due to women’s inability to maintain their labor income as readily 
as would an otherwise similar man. Since it is also true that a mother will typically 
spend money on more productive uses than a father, this disproportionately large loss 
of income can explain why PI particularly degrades nonmonetary development. 
 Given that PI often causes people to be unsure of future economic security and 
policies, their optimal behavior may be unclear. Those who are quite adept at 
assessing a situation and coping with prevailing conditions would be better able to find 
economic activity when it may be scarce. This would be a valuable skill that, like 
many skills, might be attained through successful education. I also show that people 
with high levels of education do not lose as much income following PI, presumably 
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due to a superior ability to seek employment and adjust to suboptimal economic 
conditions. 
 Political instability is a significant issue for many countries throughout the 
world. As a result of this study, we can conclude that women are more susceptible to 
income loss than men. We also know that the large drop in female income has 
significant effects for the welfare of children and wider development indicators. 
Additionally, we can confirm from this study that educated people better cope with the 
economic unpredictability caused by PI. Thus, education may be seen as a way of 
smoothing economic performance if a country is at risk of experiencing uncertainty in 
its economy. 
 
Background 
 Following its independence from France in 1960, Madagascar was riddled by 
frequent changes of presidential power often marked by military intervention. In 1975, 
the military installed Didier Ratsiraka, a career politician, as the president. True to the 
form of his ascent to power, Ratsiraka’s administration never demonstrated a great 
respect for democracy. The government held several elections over the years he was in 
power. He claimed victory in each, but there were always significant protests of the 
legitimacy of those elections. In 1991, a march against Ratsiraka turned deadly when 
dozens of the protestors were killed. This initiated a gradual transition of power to the 
opposition. Ratsiraka fled to exile in France. However, Ratsiraka regained power 
following the impeachment of the intermediary president.  
 Marc Ravalomanana was born into a poor family in a small town 
approximately 30 kilometers west of the capital, Antananarivo. He was able to parlay 
a small business, selling yogurt off the back of his bicycle, into a dairy and food 
product empire. As one of the most successful businessmen in Madagascar, 
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Ravalomanana’s first foray into politics was a successful one, as he was elected the 
mayor of the capital. He was always a sharp critic of Ratsiraka and stood as an 
opposition candidate in a presidential election during December 2001. 
 Ravalomanana was popular entering the election and expected to outpoll the 
incumbent president. When the votes were tallied, election officials announced that 
Ravalomanana had, indeed, received more votes (46%) than Ratsiraka (40%) but not 
enough to avoid a runoff, as is necessary in the French electoral system. 
Ravalomanana’s supporters claimed that the votes had been manipulated. Independent 
electoral observers concurred and declared that Ravalomanana should have been the 
outright winner. 
 Ratsiraka refused to concede power even in the face of mounting opposition. 
After a few months of strikes and protests, Ratsiraka was forced to flee the capital, 
which is located in the central highlands, when the military refused to intervene, 
saying the problem was a political issue and not a military one. 
Ratsiraka was born in and remained fantastically popular in the eastern coastal 
region. So, he attempted to reestablish a new capital in the eastern port city of 
Toamasina while Ravalomanana took control of the government in Antananarivo. 
With the country split into two factions, giving allegiance to two separate governments 
in two separate capitals, Madagascar was teetering on the edge of civil war. 
In order to regain power, Ratsiraka attempted to prevent supplies from 
reaching the capital by erecting a series of road blocks and blowing up bridges on the 
national routes leading from the coasts to the capital. This assault was somewhat 
successful, as supplies grew increasingly scarce and prices increased drastically. In 
particular, the price of petrol became exorbitantly expensive. As a result, even locally 
produced goods could not be shipped to or from the capital as the trucking industry 
essentially stopped operating. 
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Figure 1: Political Map of Madagascar 
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As the standoff continued, Ratsiraka began to lose support and the 
effectiveness of his blockade against the central highlands waned. Eventually, 
Ravalomanana was finally sworn in as the new president nearly six months after the 
election date. Shortly thereafter, Ratsiraka was forced to flee to exile in France once 
again. 
Things gradually returned to normal for Madagascar but the PI left an indelible 
mark on the Malagasy economy and its people. The economy languished during the PI 
with the GDP falling by 12% in 2002.
1
 This represents a significant loss of income for 
any country, especially one comprised of people who already were living on dollars a 
day. 
 
Literature Review 
 The basis of this study builds on the findings and theories of several other 
authors. The two foci of my study draw heavily on already established conclusions of 
writings primarily regarding the topics of human capital and the connection between 
maternal income and child welfare. 
 Political instability is a topic that has been investigated in many different 
lights. The most common manifestation is the study of the link between PI and 
economic growth or inequality. The general consensus is that PI has a negative effect 
on growth and causes inequality to rise, although the link to inequality is typically 
more contentious. These assertions typically hold regardless of the form of the PI 
event—whether coups d’état, civil wars, or other forms of rebellion. Thus, given a 
history of PI, one would expect to find lower income on average throughout the 
affected area. 
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 Even though PI has been demonstrated to cause lower economic growth, the 
distribution of income loss has not been extensively researched. It has not been shown 
that any particular subpopulation bears a greater or lesser cost. 
 It is recognized that, in developing nations, a mother’s control of income is a 
far better indicator of a child’s welfare than the father’s. Maternal income is important 
for such measures as child nutrition, health, and education as well as fertility rates. In 
turn, it is also accepted that the first few years in a child’s life, during which the 
maternal role is particularly influential, have long-lasting productivity implications for 
both the individual and, subsequently, the nation as a whole. 
 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a more holistic approach to 
evaluating the development level of a country. It incorporates income, life expectancy, 
and school attendance rates. Augustin Fosu has researched the topic and shown that PI 
leads to even lower levels of HDI than would be predicted by the decreased income. 
That extra gap has been documented but not explained. 
 With respect to the second topic, education can generate many different skills 
in a person. Of particular interest for this paper is the potential increase in adaptability 
that occurs as a person invests in their human capital.  Theodore Schultz concludes 
education improves one’s ability to deal with job disequilibria since “education—even 
primary schooling—enhances the ability of students to perceive new classes of 
problems, to clarify such problems, and to learn ways of solving them.” Since PI often 
accompanies great economic uncertainty, political instability can be said to induce the 
type of disequilibrium of which Schultz spoke. 
 In summary, there are three main points from past research that should be 
considered for the rest of this study. The first is that a mother’s income is more 
significant for a society’s nonmonetary development than a man’s. Second, HDI falls 
by a greater amount than would be expected based simply on income lost following 
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PI. Finally, when a student invests in education they become better able to adjust to 
economic disequilibria. 
 
Model 
 The basis of this study can be divided into the examination of two primary 
hypotheses. It has been repeatedly shown that, based on earlier research, PI causes 
widespread income loss throughout a country’s people. However, just as one finds that 
income is not distributed on an equal basis, one cannot assume that income will be lost 
on an equal basis. Certain subpopulations will lose a disproportionately greater portion 
of their income after facing PI. As a pedagogic example, following the deposition of a 
president, a person who holds a high government position solely due to a familial 
relationship with the president will likely lose more income than a person whose 
ethnic group had been repressed. It is the goal of this study to analyze gender and 
educational characteristics to determine whether the people possessing those traits lose 
more or less income than would be expected based on their other characteristics. 
 Given that a woman’s income is quite important for the overall welfare of a 
child relative to a man’s income, any event that causes women to lose a 
disproportionately large portion of her income would be significantly worse for 
children than would be expected based solely on the change in aggregate income. This 
corresponds with the findings of other, earlier studies that find PI causes HDI values to 
fall more than would be expected based on income losses. I seek to demonstrate that 
the reason human development indices are particularly sensitive to political instability 
is that women are among the groups that disproportionately suffer as a result of PI. 
 As is the case with many countries, Madagascar is a patriarchal society in 
which women and girls often must subordinate their needs so their male brothers, 
fathers, or husbands can fulfill their needs and goals. This could manifest itself 
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through dietary, educational, or other deprivations. These things that could inhibit a 
woman’s productivity, along with potential discrimination (even those as common as 
housekeeping and childrearing obligations), could cause women to have more tenuous 
connections to markets and thus be more susceptible to market disruptions. If I show 
that women are more vulnerable when faced with a large shock to the economy 
produced by PI, then I will have demonstrated a credible link between PI and 
exceptionally low HDI. 
 The second aspect of this study is an examination of the effects of education on 
a person’s ability to cope with significant disruptions to the economic order. PI often 
causes an economy to sputter, as normal activity must be suspended for security 
concerns or because dysfunctional government institutions generate significant 
impediments to normal business transactions. Madagascar certainly experienced 
disruption given the large drop in GDP. In these situations, it is reasonable to assume 
that successfully earning a livelihood becomes a much more complicated task. In the 
face of great economic uncertainty, those who are better prepared to adjust to rapidly 
changing conditions will fare better. A person who can adapt to the prevailing job 
market will be more likely to find available positions or acquire new skills and thus 
maintain their labor income. 
 The most common method thought to build the set of skills possessed by a 
person, which could also make him a more flexible worker, is a person’s education. 
So, if education makes people more adaptable and PI creates a great deal of turmoil 
and uncertainty, then the more educated would be in a better position to find new or 
additional work that would supplement their decreased income from their primary 
source of work. If, other things equal, people with higher levels of education who face 
worse political instability retained more of their income, then there would be evidence 
that peoples’ educations do, in fact, assist them as they attempt to cope with PI. 
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 In order to establish that women lose more income and the educated retain 
more income than would otherwise be expected I use a collection of demographic 
data, community-level data, and crisis-related data. Labor income will be the 
dependent variable in this analysis. Due to the skewed income distribution, the 
logarithm of income is a more appropriate form. Since income is such a 
straightforward metric, little explanation is needed as to the rationale for its inclusion. 
A corollary related to income should be included to explain some of the variation. Due 
to the structure of the survey, the frequency of pay was used to construct people’s 
annual income. But, pay frequency may also reveal something about the nature of a 
person’s employment. For instance, a day laborer would presumably be more likely to 
report daily wages while a business owner may be more likely to report income based 
on monthly or annual profits. 
Many of the other demographic variables have an equally clear reason to be 
included in this regression and equally clear implications. Age is typically associated 
with higher income as work experience is considered an opportunity to build 
productivity. Even if there were no compounded effect of being a specific gender, a 
person’s sex by itself would have a significant influence on a person’s income. In 
Madagascar, as in many places, women systematically earn less money than men. 
Especially with respect to investigating the effect of PI on women, it is important to 
keep in mind that women will already have lower incomes. I also choose to control for 
a person’s housing status—whether their household owns their house or obtained 
lodging through alternate means. Since holding a deed to a piece of property could be 
indicative of a person’s access to credit, it might also be indicative of their ability to 
finance income-generating activities. Another dimension of one’s living situation that 
creates variation among respondents worth noting is the difference between urban and 
rural dwellers. Previous research has demonstrated that people living in urban areas 
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have a systematically higher standard of living than do those living in rural areas. So, 
by identifying those in rural and urban areas, I need not be concerned about structural 
differences in labor income and employment. Madagascar is a very large island (about 
the size of California and Oregon) and has 22 different ethnicities so each part of the 
island has its own, distinct characteristics. In order to compensate for these contrasting 
environments in the context of this study, I include indicator variables for the three 
provinces that are included in this study. This will account for some of the variation in 
income based solely on geographic location. Because one may reasonably expect the 
effects of the PI to dissipate over time, I have generated a variable that captures the 
passage of time by measuring the number of years that have passed since the 2002 PI 
disturbance. This assumes that the PI does not force people below some form of a 
poverty threshold, after which they are in a poverty trap. The creation of poverty traps 
by PI is worthy of study but beyond the scope of this paper. 
 There is significant variation in development that exists among areas. There 
are (few) places that approach the levels of middle-income countries and there are 
places suffering from poverty as severe as in any other African nation. Places at 
different levels of development could feasibly react differently to PI. Since the 
development in Madagascar is not randomly assigned, the characteristics of the area 
partially determine the nature of the place. Several important descriptive variables can 
be employed that will approximate the effect of the town on the survey respondent’s 
income. 
 Among the available community-level data, I have decided to include the 
population of a person’s region. While I do not have a specific hypothesis as to how PI 
will vary with population, it is feasible that a heavily populated area allows a person a 
greater degree of anonymity to avoid involvement or it could be that a larger 
population increases the likelihood of ethnic mixing and thus fighting. Also of 
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potential interest would be the population density of a town, since a large population 
spread over a large geographic area would be similar to a small area with a small 
population. However, the incredible detail of the Ilo survey makes it difficult to 
incorporate other data sources, as the surface area for each of the hundreds of regions 
is unavailable. Even if it were available, it might not prove useful since geographical 
boundaries in Madagascar are often poorly defined. Also, even within a town’s 
jurisdiction, there are typically large swaths of uninhabited agricultural land or 
undeveloped wilderness, both of which would be included in town acreage. Therefore, 
a constant population variable across residents of a region will help isolate the 
variance arising from the size of a town’s population. 
 In order to estimate the government’s influence in an area, which could 
indicate preferential treatment if the government selectively place their offices, I 
include the number of government ministry offices. The presence of these branches 
could alter peoples’ reactions to the PI by creating a more tangible link to the 
government. Finally, I also take into account the likelihood that a person will face a 
natural disaster. This is a vitally important characteristic of Madagascar, given that it 
suffers from violent cyclones and frequent droughts. If a town faces frequent natural 
disasters, it may be more difficult for people to rebuild a living or undertake income-
generating activities if the natural disasters are compounded by a man-made PI 
disaster. 
 When including education in the regressions, there are two ways to measure 
educational attainment, each of which is more compatible with its own theory of 
education’s value. The first method of determining educational status, years of 
successful schooling, is most compatible with a human capital accumulation since 
each year of schooling supposedly increases the productivity of a worker. The second 
method of measuring educational achievement, which reflects the highest school 
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degree completed, is more compatible with signaling since a person who completes a 
certain number of years of schooling and passes an exam did not necessarily learn 
appreciably more than a person who had learned marginally less over the same 
number of years but did not pass the exam. In the end, though, it may not be of great 
consequence through which frame we view education since both yield the same 
fundamental results. 
 In the context of this study, I employ a structure used by Joan Esteban to 
define political instability, or “conflict” in his terms. He defines a political system as 
“a particular way of choosing among alternatives” for the distribution of public goods, 
which are valued to varying degrees by individuals. Political instability is “a challenge 
to such a system, which is costly.” I use his definition and then create a new one for 
the severity of political instability: the degree of societal and economic disruption 
caused by a challenge to the prevailing political system. 
I employ two separate methods to proxy the severity of the disruption caused 
by PI. Both are imperfect measures but do rely on changes in the economy that would 
be uniform except for the impact of the political instability. Both methods of 
estimation yield the same results, to different degrees of certainty, so it is not 
necessarily important which specific measurement is used. 
The first metric of PI that I apply is the change in the price of rice. Since rice is 
undoubtedly the most important food product in Madagascar, the variation in the price 
of that good is going to have the greatest impact on the average person’s welfare. By 
focusing on domestic rice, any changes in the global rice market are irrelevant. So, if 
the price of rice increases by a high percentage, then something is happening in 
Madagascar such that a given area has less access. Taking rice to be a normal good 
(income elasticity = .579, price elasticity = -.469) and assuming no change in 
preferences, given the significant loss of income/wealth, the demand for rice would 
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have decreased.
2
 With a 4.5% increase in the price faced by the average customer and 
decreased demand, there must have been decreased supply. Thus, the relative price 
increase shows the change in the scarcity of rice. Whether PI decreases productivity or 
impedes distribution chains to cause this scarcity, it affects consumers in the same 
way. So, as PI becomes worse in this context, it will be increasingly disruptive to the 
supply of rice and the price will subsequently rise. 
The second metric of PI that I apply is the percentage change in the fare for 
public transportation from the district’s primary location to the provincial capital. 
Given that one of the primary forms of disruption caused by the PI were the road 
blockades that prevented the movement of goods and people, the cost of transportation 
would logically be directly affected by the relative strength of the political instability’s 
impact. Fuel, being a primary determinant of the fare of transportation, can thus 
directly reflect PI. Another potential connection between PI and the cost of 
transportation is the imposition of a potential risk premium, where it may be 
dangerous to transport people due to bandits or risk of extortion. These factors will 
yield higher relative price increases for fares as PI grows more severe. 
While the results for all of the aforementioned characteristics may be 
interesting simply due to their description information, they do not provide any 
particularly valuable conclusions, especially since some of the results are quite 
predictable, such as women earning less than men, the better educated earning more 
than the less educated. The most important aspect of this study—and the one from 
which the primary results are derived—are the coefficients on and significance of the 
interaction terms I include in each model. 
In the case where I analyze the effect of PI on a woman’s income, I essentially 
aim to assess the difference in income that occurs for a woman as the measures of PI 
imply that severity increases. I will have already included a standalone variable in the 
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regression for gender so any further analysis will take into account the lower mean 
income for women. I will also include the actual PI term so that I may account for 
systematic shifts in income experienced by the entire population. Thus, the interaction 
of sex and each PI term gives the direction of the shift in income caused by being a 
female who experiences great PI, given the separate gender and PI effects. So, a 
negative (positive) sign on the interaction term would mean that given the general 
effect of the PI and the lower income of Malagasy women, a woman would lose more 
(less) income than would an otherwise equal man. It is the sign of this coefficient that 
will give the answer to the primary question with respect to gender. 
 In response to the second question I ask in this study, I investigate whether 
educated people attain additional skills that allow an extra degree of flexibility and 
innovativeness. This adaptability would then allow a person to maintain their income 
in the face of PI. Essentially, this entails demonstrating empirically that the coefficient 
on the product of schooling and PI severity is positive, meaning that the drop in 
peoples’ income is smaller with more education. People with higher levels of 
education will, as one might expect, have higher incomes than otherwise equal people 
with less education. This is logical as, in Madagascar, having completed more 
schooling allows for entry into more desirable and better paying jobs, such as a teacher 
or bush-taxi driver. Again, the widespread income change that occurs to the entire 
population will be addressed though the inclusion of the single PI variable. That will 
allow the interaction term to represent the effect of being well educated in an 
economically uncertain environment caused by PI, given that the educated already 
earn more money and that there are significant income shifts caused by PI. 
  When seeking the answer to these questions, I will employ the following OLS 
equations. The first of the below equations is for the case where education is measured 
by the years of schooling completed by the respondent. The second actually involves 
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three interaction terms for each of the three potential degree classes obtained by each 
person. 
! 
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Where: i= individual, j = community 
y = log income 
x = individual variables 
comm = community variables 
sex = 1 for women, 0 for men 
schoolyears = years of schooling 
diploma = primary, secondary, university degree 
crisis = PI severity variable, = 0 before PI  j 
 Therefore, in the context of this particular model, the value of 
! 
"  is the value 
from which I draw conclusions regarding being female. The sign of 
! 
"  will answer the 
second question, regarding education. A positive value would correspond to the 
proposed hypothesis. The remaining variables are individual- and community-level 
variables. More specifically, the vector of individual variables (x) consists of rurality, 
education, highest degree obtained, age, housing ownership, number of years since the 
PI, and pay frequency. The vector of community variables (comm) includes the three 
province dummies, regional population, ministry offices, and the risk of natural 
disaster. Because many of the variables are constant for all people in the same 
community, I cluster the variables by region (roughly analogous to US counties), 
which is the most accurate level to which the respondents are identifiable. 
 In the context of this study, 
! 
"  and 
! 
"  are the variables on interest because they 
represent the marginal effect of female gender and school completion respectively. If 
one lets:  
 s = sex variable 
e = education variable 
c = crisis variable 
y = dependent income variable 
! 
"
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 then the following holds: 
! 
" =
# 2y
#s#c
 and 
! 
" =
# 2y
#e#c
 
Thus, I will be seeking the change in income if a person “becomes” female or a person 
“attains” a higher degree as political instability becomes more severe. That will inform 
me whether women lost greater income and whether the educated maintained their 
income. 
 Through running these OLS regressions, I seek to identify the additional 
determinants of income following the political instability yielded by the confluence of 
higher PI severity and a particular trait, namely gender and educational status. 
  
Data 
 In order to examine the differential effect of political instability on different 
groups of peoples’ labor incomes, I will compile several separate sources to provide 
rich descriptive capability that will satisfy data needs. 
 The majority of the data for this econometric analysis is drawn from the 
Enquête Périodique auprès des Ménages (EPM). The EPM is a recurring household 
survey in Madagascar. It is conducted under the auspices of the Institut Statistique 
(INSTAT), the government ministry responsible for data collection and analysis. The 
EPM is conducted repeatedly, contingent on the political and financial support 
necessary to carry it out. Unfortunately, this may introduce an element of bias in that 
they are only conducted during relatively stable times. The EPM is designed in such a 
manner that it is representative of the entire country. While it does not survey every 
district throughout the country, it does survey thousands of people in most districts in 
each of the six provinces. 
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 The EPM is unarguably the most comprehensive source of information on the 
population dynamics of the Malagasy people. The first EPM was carried out in 1993 
and was relatively rudimentary. Subsequent EPMs occurred in 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004 
and 2005. I choose to restrict my analysis to the data available from 1999, 2001, 2004 
and 2005 EPMs. The 2002 EPM is not considered due to improper surveying 
techniques following the PI while there is too long of a gap between 1993 and the 
instance of PI under consideration here. The quality and detail of the surveys has 
evolved greatly over the years. Generally speaking, the questions present in the earlier 
surveys were still present in later surveys but had been expanded on or refined. All of 
the variables of interest for this study were included such that they were recorded in 
each of the four years. 
 For the analysis, I choose to pool the data so that I am essentially creating one 
very large collection of independent observations. However, since the observations 
preceding the PI and those following the PI should not be considered the same given 
the “treatment” of the PI, I differentiate between the surveys by assigning to them a 
variable representing the number of years that had passed since the PI. For the two 
surveys before the instability, the value of zero was assigned. This should account for 
any economy-wide shifts that would make survey responses differ among the years.  
 Since I use a pair of surveys before and after the particular case of political 
instability in question along with the fact that the surveys are not of panel form, there 
is no way to ensure the homogeneity of the samples before and after. A single house 
may be sampled in separate surveys but represent distinct households if it were the 
case that the original subject vacated the domicile, which was subsequently inhabited 
by a different set of people. This should actually pose minimal problems, as the 
sample size should ensure the representativeness of the sample for each area. 
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A migratory issue of greater consequence is the fact that there may have been 
selective emigration following the PI. However, this likely should not cause great 
worry either. There were relatively few emigrants, .9% of the entire population over 
2000-2002, from Madagascar over the years in question.
3
 This provides an upper 
bound to the number of people who could have left in the year following the PI, which 
would still be quite low by international standards. Additionally, given the nature of 
the likely emigrants, the relatively well educated would be the only people who could 
afford the exorbitant costs of travel. Taking this to be the case, the findings of this 
study likely would represent a lower bound to the estimates for education.  
There is another issue of nonrandom internal migration where the PI directly 
causes people to systematically leave certain areas, presumably high-severity, for 
other areas, presumably low-severity areas. This yields two likely effects. The first is 
that the relocation of people to areas of different PI severity will dampen the treatment 
effect of the instability. This would seemingly imply that the PI had a more random 
effect on peoples’ incomes than it actually had, with people who experience high 
levels of PI intermingling with people who experienced low levels. The second effect 
is that emigrants may not perfectly represent the population of a given area. If the 
most vulnerable leave areas of great PI upheaval, then the variation in income change 
caused by PI is likely a lower bound as those who fared the worst left the affected 
areas. However, if the least vulnerable had the capacity to and chose to leave the 
affected areas, then these values would provide an upper bound. Unfortunately, there 
has not been a comprehensive study of migration dynamics following the election 
violence. One might think that, given the primarily agricultural nature of the Malagasy 
economy and the disruption to business involving non-manual labor, many people 
losing jobs in the non-agricultural sector would be absorbed into family farms and 
become among those in the surplus agricultural labor force (see Lewis’ Dual Sector 
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Model). Regardless of which types of people migrated it likely would not have a great 
effect on the overall results, as there were not widespread displacement or refugees. 
 Many of the variables I analyze were derived from the demographic section of 
the EPMs. This section of the survey covers a wide variety of topics but I picked a 
small subset. Gender is the most obvious selection from this group due to its 
significant predictive power and it’s fundamental role in the model being analyzed 
currently. For the purposes of this study, the gender variable is set to zero if the person 
is a male and one if the person is female. Age is given in multiple forms, both through 
birthdates and through age in years. I chose to use the age in years because the exact 
date the survey was conducted was not given and a difference of weeks would likely 
make little difference for labor earnings. The demographic section of the EPM also 
gives the rurality of one’s living environment. I again created a simple indicator 
variable where the value for urban dwellers is equal to one and rural dwellers takes the 
value of two. For the final two EPMs, the urban setting was divided into primary and 
secondary urban areas. I simply redefined both of these as generally urban, since I 
assume some degree of homogeneity among urban areas. In order to capture some of 
the significant variation (language, ethnicity, religion, etc.) among the provinces of the 
country, I also create an indicator variable for each of the provinces under analysis. 
The final demographic variable I drew from the EPM describes the housing status of 
each respondent’s household. It goes into considerable detail as to the ownership of 
their living space—whether the survey respondent owns their home, rents, receives 
housing from their job, or a couple other situations. I simplify the measure so that the 
variable takes the value of one if the respondent’s household is also the owner of the 
domicile in which they reside. I additionally created a variable measuring the passage 
of time since the electoral violence. To each response originating from the two surveys 
conducted before the PI, I assigned a value of zero. Then, for the two surveys 
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following the PI, every respondent was assigned the value of two for the 2004 EPM 
and the value of three for the 2005 EPM. 
 Another important section of the EPM from which I derived my data was 
information about income. There were several potential sources of income included in 
the survey. I chose to focus on labor income because alternative sources of income 
were rarely reported and it was impossible to determine the exact nature of that money 
whereas there is a relative degree of homogeneity across labor income source, 
although not necessarily the type of work. The structure of the EPM survey may 
unfortunately obfuscate the source of income received by individuals. The income 
reported in the EPM is from the person’s primary employment. Because respondents 
self-report their income, the answers may be subjective if the person holds multiple 
types of employment, if they work for in-kind payment, or if they are self-employed. 
So, a person may report zero income because they actually owned their firm and thus 
did not technically receive a wage. However, it is unlikely that very many people 
would manage a business, as Madagascar is a difficult place to conduct business (134
th
 
most difficult worldwide).
4
 Those who did not work for wages, most commonly 
children, had their observations simply treated as missing rather than assigning them 
values of zero. The actual format of the data required a bit of manipulation for 
comparability across survey respondents. Each person was asked for both the amount 
of money they receive per pay period and the frequency of pay period. In the first 
three EPMs, income was measured in Malagasy Francs. In 2005, the Malagasy Ariary 
replaced the Franc as the official currency so the final EPM was denominated in 
Ariary. I converted all four EPMs to Ariary by dividing the incomes from the first 
three surveys by five, the ratio of Ariary to Franc. Each respondent gave the frequency 
of pay; either their pay was per day, week, month, or year. I chose to convert all of the 
incomes to annual income. However, given Madagascar’s labor surplus. It would be 
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inappropriate to assume that a person received their daily wage 365 times a year. So, I 
made the assumption that people would actually work two thirds of the time. So, a 
person reporting their daily wage receives that 240 times a year, a weekly wage 35 
times and a monthly wage 8 times a year. This is admittedly a somewhat arbitrary 
assumption but not necessarily unreasonable given that there are likely some working 
more often and some working less often. For the actual analysis, using the log of 
income is a more appropriate statistic to use given the income distribution. However, 
replacing log income with the actual value for income does not fundamentally change 
the results. 
 Another determinant of income and primary focus of this study is the 
educational achievement of the survey respondents. There are two separate ways to 
measure this given the data available from the EPM, each reflecting a different 
perspective on education. The first source of information on the education of each 
person is a question in the Education section in which each person is asked to identify 
the highest grade of the Malagasy school system they successfully completed. Some 
people never attended school and are thus listed at zero years. The alternative method 
of measuring educational status is through analyzing the highest degree obtained by 
each person. In Madagascar, there is an exam following each level of school: lower 
elementary, upper elementary, and secondary (see Figure 2). In some cases, there are 
different exams for each level, depending on the track in which the student studies. 
For simplicity of analysis I have combined all degree holders into three dummy 
variables—those with a primary school degree, those with a secondary school degree, 
and those with a university degree. 
Another important source of variation in incomes of people both before and 
after the PI is the town in which a person lives. There is great inequality across regions 
in Madagascar, with the central highlands generally experiencing much higher 
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Figure 2: Malagasy School System 
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standards of living while the coastal areas of Madagascar generally suffer more abject 
poverty.  This is particularly relevant with respect to the urban-rural divide. 
Additionally, different areas with similar living standards may vary significantly in 
other dimensions. In order to attempt to control for these potential sources of variation, 
I include a set of descriptive variables that give the predominant conditions in each 
location. 
 Six weeks before the PI in question occurred, the Ilo program based out of 
Cornell conducted a detailed survey of 1385 of the 1395 towns in Madagascar. By 
convening focus groups in each village, the Ilo team was able to collect a wide set of 
primarily descriptive details ranging from economic to health to government presence 
variables. While I can identify town characteristics accurately for each village, I 
cannot reliably assign these values to the individual characteristics from the EPMs 
because that data is only identifiable to the district level. So, for each of these districts, 
the values were determined by combining the towns in that district by population. 
In this analysis, I have included several straightforward variables. The first 
variable I include is the total population of the district. This is calculated using the 
simple sum of the populations in each town. Using a similar method, I calculate the 
total number of government ministry offices by summing the number of offices 
located in each town. Finally, I derive the average number of natural disasters faced by 
inhabitants of each district. In this case, natural disasters are defined to be significant 
weather-, plague- and agricultural-related disruptions to production. I weighted the 
town’s frequency of natural disasters by the population to attain an accurate 
representation of the number of disruptions to production a typical resident will face in 
a given year. 
 The final source of data for my analysis is the most unusual. Following the 
incredible shock to the economy and political system caused by the PI, the Ilo 
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researchers returned to Madagascar to catalog how prevailing conditions had changed 
throughout the island. In each district, key informants were selected to answer 
questions, the responses of which should be identical for all townspeople. Due to 
logistical constraints the follow-up survey was only carried out in three of the six 
provinces. However, the two provinces with the largest populaces were included and 
the total percentage of the population is greater than 60%. In an ideal world, each town 
in all six of the provinces would have been surveyed with a similar degree of rigor to 
that of the survey conducted prior to the PI. Unfortunately, that is not the case so the 
scope of the analysis is limited to the three surveyed provinces (Antananarivo, 
Fianarantsoa, Mahajanga, see Figure 3).  In several cases, there were regions that did 
not have an observed value for one or both of the PI estimates. When this was the 
case, I imputed the value for PI by taking the average of each bordering region for 
which the value was measured. The severity of the PI is a vital component of the 
analysis, without which meaningful results cannot be derived in this context. 
 Since there is no standardized metric for PI, I must use something that can be 
measured but also is directly related to PI. It may be impossible to use a universal 
measure of PI since its effects are quite contingent on the country and context. Given 
the methods used to create instability in Madagascar, a good measure might be the 
number of roadblocks per mile of road or the number of reported bombings. However, 
the primary function of the survey was not to explicitly measure PI but rather to 
catalogue the conditions that arose following the PI. Based on the available question-
response pairs, two prime candidates emerge. The first way I choose to measure PI is  
through the change in the price of domestic rice in the May (the height of the harvest 
season) of the year preceding the PI and the May of the year following the PI. Taking  
the price of rice at the same time of year removes problems of seasonality. Rice is the 
staple food for the Malagasy people and has the most inelastic price and income  
! 
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Figure 3: Included Regions 
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demand of all food categories.
5
 The price of rice is for one “kapoaka” (metal can the 
size of a soup can) of domestically produced white rice. The kapoaka is only sold at 
the retail level, as kilograms are used for wholesale distribution. This is a sufficiently 
specific product that the units of rice should be perfectly comparable across regions. 
 The second method I use to estimate the severity of the political instability is to 
look at the increase in the price of the cost of transport for one person from the chief 
regional town to the provincial capital. This would most likely constitute public 
transportation on a minibus. On most routes, the price is fixed through an oligopoly of 
the companies operating that route. However, there are occasionally several 
companies that operate at different prices given the capacity of their vehicles. Again, 
this was asked as a comparison of May of the year preceding and following the PI, so 
seasonality of gasoline prices would also not be an issue. 
The PI value holds constant for a given region for the two surveyed years 
following the electoral violence. However, for regressions to measure the true effect of 
the PI rather than incendiary nature of the area, the values for PI are set to zero for the 
years of 1999 and 2001. Thus, the values of the variables associated with the 
coefficients 
! 
" , 
! 
" , and 
! 
" will take the value of zero since they equal the PI value or a 
product involving PI. This leaves only the values for 2004 and 2005 to determine the 
three coefficients (
! 
" , 
! 
" , and 
! 
"). 
 
Results 
 A look at the primary regression tables (Tables 1-2) gives a result that is 
generally favorable for my hypotheses. In some cases, the results support my 
propositions in a more nuanced way. 
 For each set of interaction terms, I ran two regressions. The first involves the 
interaction terms, which will produce the conclusions of this paper, and the standalone 
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variables that are involved in the interaction. To that regression, I then add control 
variables in the form of both individual variables and community level variables. 
Because the first equation will not account for all of the great deal of variation that 
will exist in income, it is possible, and extremely likely, that the values for the 
interaction terms will differ between the two forms. Because the regressions involving 
the set of controls should better isolate the effect of being female or well educated 
during PI, they will be the preferred form, although I will allow the uncontrolled 
results to inform me as well. 
 For simplicity of viewing, I exclude the values for all control variables from 
the regression output tables (available upon request). While the coefficients and their 
statistical significance do not directly affect my conclusions, I will briefly summarize 
those that were statistically significant 
 All education controls were statistically significantly positive when the price of 
rice was used as the PI measure. In the full model, the education variables were 
positive but not significant. All appearances of the frequency of pay were statistically 
significant at the 99% level. But, this is likely a product of the construction of income 
rather than necessarily showing the effect of a given type of employment. The age of 
the respondent is also significantly positive, as would be expected, at the 95% level 
when the change in the price of rice is used. Incomes were statistically significantly 
higher as time passed following the PI, which could be the result of new policies or the 
dissipation of a negative shock. Interestingly, government ministry offices were 
associated with lower income (significant at 99% level), which would correspond to a 
situation in which the government selectively places offices in areas of great need or a 
situation where ministry offices drain funds from otherwise productive uses. 
 The variable that provides the clearest results is that indicating a person is 
female. In each of its four appearances, women have are found to have a lower 
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income, other things equal, significant at the 99% level (see Tables 1-4). While this is 
not surprising, it is still a significant result. If women were to have higher incomes, 
then the assumption that women would lose income due to weaker labor market 
connections would appear flawed. However, the regressions resoundingly support the 
assumption that women systematically have lower incomes. 
 All of the variables that were included in order to control for the effects of 
simply possessing a certain characteristic may be informative or they may simply 
reinforce an already accepted tenet. However, none of them inform at all about the 
effects of PI on the groups of interest—women and the highly educated. In order to 
investigate those questions, I will focus on the coefficients on the interaction terms, or 
in the above model, the values represented by 
! 
"  and 
! 
" . 
 The results for the coefficient measuring the effect of PI on a woman’s labor 
income (
! 
" ) provide an answer supportive of my hypothesis. When the change in the 
price of rice was the preferred method of estimating PI severity, the coefficient was 
statistically significantly negative when some of the variation was controlled for by 
inclusion of personal and community variables. In those cases, the coefficients were 
significant at the 95% level (top row, Tables 1, 3). For each of the other forms of the 
regression, the coefficients are statistically insignificant yet uniformly negative 
(Tables 2, 4). This only serves as further evidence that, as PI became more severe, 
women were increasingly at risk of losing their income. 
 With respect to the question of whether people with high levels of education 
were able to maintain their labor income, I am able to conclude in a nuanced manner 
that education did assist people in coping with the economic volatility. While the 
education measure using the years of schooling completed does not attain statistical 
significance, both of the controlled regressions yielded positive coefficients with the 
coefficient involving the price change drawing very near to statistically significant 
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(row 2, Tables 1-2). When the alternative measure of education is employed, it 
becomes clear that those with the very highest levels of education are the primary 
drivers of a positive relationship between labor income and education in a politically 
unstable environment. With the price change of rice used as the measure of PI, 
possessing a university-level degree significantly improves a person’s ability to 
maintain labor income while dealing with PI (fourth row, Table 3). While none of the 
other interaction terms for education assume a statistically significant value, each of 
the controlled regressions take a positive value. This leads me to conclude that all 
forms of education likely better prepare a person to adjust to a PI-induced 
economically uncertain environment and a university education is a way to ensure 
better performance. 
 The regressions that were run for the entire sample were also run for the subset 
including only the women and a subset including only the men (Tables 5-8 and Tables 
9-12, respectively). In the case of women, the coefficients on education generally 
reflect the same conclusions. Nearly all of the appearances of education carry a 
positive coefficient and the university-price change term again takes a statistically 
significant coefficient for both the controlled an uncontrolled regressions, these times 
at the 99% level (third row, Table 7). Thus, the more general conclusion that 
university degrees allow people to maintain their income holds true for women in 
particular. The results for men did not conflict with those for women. The coefficient 
on a university degree, this time with the cost of travel used to measure PI, is 
statistically significantly positive (third row, Table 12). Furthermore, the interaction of 
the years of schooling with the PI variable is also significantly positive, strengthening 
the argument that all education can benefit people if they face PI (row one, Table 10). 
 One factor that has been assumed to be true throughout the paper but is only 
now found to be true is that PI is destructive of income. The PI measures are negative 
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in three of the four inclusions with the one positive instance quite statistically 
insignificant. Additionally, with the price change taken as the PI measure, it is shown 
to be significantly negative for women (row 3, Table 5 and row 7, Table 7). On the 
other hand, travel cost is shown to have a negative effect on males’ incomes (row 3, 
Table 10 and row 7, Table 12). Taken with the many negative yet insignificant 
coefficients, it reasonable to conclude that all groups’ incomes were hurt in an 
absolute sense by the political instability. 
 I choose to use the log of income as the dependent variable in the majority of 
my analysis because one would expect the nature of the income distribution to prove 
problematic in analysis of income without the log being taken. This seems to be the 
case given the lack of evidence for any kind of statistically significant effect for many 
variables (Tables 13-16). Furthermore, the few variables obtaining statistical 
significance coincide with the findings of the regressions obtained using the log of 
income. That indicates that the results of the regressions do not hinge on the treatment 
of income. Hence, I choose to employ the log of income as the preferred form of the 
dependant variable. 
 
Conclusions 
 A mother’s income is far more important for the wellbeing of a child than a 
father’s income. Thus, a loss of a mother’s income will yield worse outcomes for their 
children than would an equal loss of the father’s income. So, if political instability 
causes a disproportionately large drop in female income, it will also lead to even 
worse human development indicators than would be expected based solely on 
aggregate income changes. 
 Along with political instability often comes economic instability and 
uncertainty. There is typically a widespread loss in productivity and income associated 
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with PI. If a person were able to adapt to newly prevalent conditions and seek 
solutions to unresolved problems and impediments, then they would be in a better 
position to maintain their income levels, or at least mitigate income loss. According to 
my theory, people attain this flexibility through schooling or at least are perceived to 
have acquired these skills by demonstrating their ability to pass a national exam. 
 I investigate the validity of these two distinct but related claims through the 
lens of the aftermath of a coup d’état that occurred in Madagascar during 2001-2002. 
The economy was badly damaged during this period, as the GDP dropped by 12% in 
the year following the PI. This corresponds to significant income loss for the 
Malagasy people. While the vast majority of people did lose income, there is no 
known rule as to the distribution of income lost. Surely, there must have been 
individuals who suffered worse than others, and the results of this study confirm this 
assertion. 
 By taking the change in the price of rice or by taking the increase in travel 
costs to be a reasonably accurate measure of the degree to which the local economy 
was disrupted, I find that PI causes women to lose income at a greater rate than would 
otherwise be expected. I also find that people with higher levels of education are more 
likely to retain their income. Therefore, an instance of PI may cause a 
disproportionately large fall in human development indicators where the loss of 
maternal income in the intermediary link. Also, these findings provide evidence that 
schooling equips people with some form of skills or more intimate connection to the 
market so that the educated are better prepared to cope with the accompanying 
disequilibrium induced by PI. 
 The prime contribution of this paper is to identify the differential impact of PI 
and peoples’ responses to those events. However, this paper is focused on just one of 
many forms of PI in one country. Since PI is widespread throughout the developing 
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world, it would not be terribly difficult to replicate this model with respect to a 
separate PI event in another country if a reasonably reliable measure of political 
instability is available. There are many other characteristics that could potentially 
affect a person’s ability to cope with political instability. Further research is needed to 
determine exactly who is affected and how are they affected. From these identities, we 
may draw more conclusions regarding peoples’ reaction to economic disequilibrium 
induced by PI. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Regression Results 
 
Primary Analysis 
 
Years of Schooling 
                        Table 1: Price Change                                                  Table 2: Travel Cost 
(
! 
" ) PriceChange*Sex -1.561 
(1.329) 
-2.033** 
(0.831) 
 (
! 
" ) TravelCost*Sex -0.238 
(0.222) 
-0.077 
(0.203) 
(
! 
" ) YearsOfSchooling* 
PriceChange 
0.3217 
(0.2004) 
0.228 
(0.154) 
 (
! 
" ) YearsOfSchooling* 
TravelCost 
-0.018 
(0.034) 
0.0245 
(0.034) 
Sex 
-0.951*** 
(0.252) 
-1.359*** 
(0.258) 
 
Sex 
-1.041*** 
(0.341) 
-1.700*** 
(0.296) 
YearsOfSchooling 
-0.024 
(0.030) 
0.050*** 
(0.014) 
 
YearsOfSchooling 
-0.020 
(0.047) 
0.019 
(0.048) 
PriceChange 
0.094 
(1.686) 
-0.761 
(1.420) 
 
TravelCost 
0.303 
(0.484) 
-0.3663 
(0.415) 
  
and 
controls 
 
  
and 
controls 
Observations 6925 3105  Observations 4775 2086 
R-Squared .114 .384  R-Squared .156 .371 
F Stat 53.60 56.02 
 
F Stat 28.24 23.55 
 
 
Highest Degree Obtained 
                          Table 3: Price Change                                                     Table 4: Travel Cost 
(
! 
" ) PriceChange*Sex -1.546 
(1.336) 
-2.086** 
(0.884) 
 
(
! 
" ) TravelCost*Sex -0.237 
(0.214) 
-0.077 
(0.205) 
(
! 
"1) PrimaryDegree* 
PriceChange 
1.239 
(0.803) 
0.280 
(0.892) 
 (
! 
"1) PrimaryDegree* 
TravelCost 
-0.085 
(0.2156) 
0.1283 
(0.2202) 
(
! 
" 2) SecondaryDegree* 
PriceChange 
5.660 
(3.536) 
0.845 
(3.753) 
 (
! 
" 2) SecondaryDegree* 
TravelCost 
-0.182 
(0.323) 
0.325 
(0.337) 
(
! 
" 3) UniversityDegree* 
PriceChange 
4.526 
(3.956) 
9.104** 
(4.032) 
 (
! 
" 3) UniversityDegree* 
TravelCost 
-0.210 
(0.351) 
0.438 
(0.381) 
Sex 
-0.955*** 
(0.237) 
-1.358*** 
(0.260) 
 
Sex 
-1.024*** 
(0.321) 
-1.700*** 
(0.299) 
PrimaryDegree 
-0.383** 
(0.185) 
0.326*** 
(0.1164) 
 
PrimaryDegree 
-0.243 
(0.296) 
0.081 
(0.317) 
SecondaryDegree 
-0.200 
(0.242) 
0.734*** 
(0.177) 
 
SecondaryDegree 
-0.044 
(0.461) 
0.459 
(0.507) 
UniversityDegree 
0.3275 
(0.27) 
0.717*** 
(0.177) 
 
UniversityDegree 
0.255 
(0.462) 
0.124 
(0.535) 
PriceChange 
1.544 
(2.194) 
0.599 
(1.537) 
 
TravelCost 
0.252 
(0.332) 
-0.274 
(0.330) 
  
and 
controls 
 
  
and 
controls 
Observations 6939 3105 
 
Observations 4796 2086 
R-Squared .122 .384 
 
R-Squared .157 .372 
F Stat 26.67 61.32 
 
F Stat 26.30 26.37 
 
Note: * 90% Confidence, ** 95% Confidence, *** 99% Confidence 
 Standard Error in parentheses 
 Dependent Variables: Log Income!
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Women Only 
 
Years of Schooling 
                         Table 5: Price Change                                                       Table 6: Travel Cost 
(
! 
" ) YearsOfSchooling* 
PriceChange 
0.140 
(0.184) 
0.250 
(0.226) 
 (
! 
" ) YearsOfSchooling* 
TravelCost 
0.011 
(0.0491) 
0.009 
(0.0488) 
YearsOfSchooling 
0.050* 
(0.028) 
0.056* 
(0.028) 
 
YearsOfSchooling 
0.038 
(0.064) 
0.037 
(0.081) 
PriceChange 
-1.568* 
(0.897) 
-2.555* 
(1.383) 
 
TravelCost 
-0.129 
(0.583) 
-0.114 
(0.666) 
  
and 
controls 
 
  
and 
controls 
Observations 3736 1552 
 
Observations 2892 1190 
R-Squared .023 .143 
 
R-Squared .008 .122 
F Stat 15.11 11.95 
 
F Stat 1.91 5.96 
!
 
 
Highest Degree Obtained 
                      Table 7: Price Change                                                           Table 8: Travel Cost 
(
! 
"1) PrimaryDegree* 
PriceChange 
0.476 
(0.736) 
0.044 
(0.793) 
 (
! 
"1) PrimaryDegree* 
TravelCost 
0.075 
(0.310) 
-0.073 
(0.292) 
(
! 
" 2) SecondaryDegree* 
PriceChange 
3.713 
(2.751) 
5.079 
(6.816) 
 (
! 
" 2) SecondaryDegree* 
TravelCost 
0.082 
(0.571) 
0.647 
(0.590) 
(
! 
" 3) UniversityDegree* 
PriceChange 
14.475*** 
(4.049) 
17.891*** 
(2.902) 
 (
! 
" 3) UniversityDegree* 
TravelCost 
-0.156 
(0.407) 
-0.180 
(0.692) 
PrimaryDegree 
0.092 
(0.200) 
0.213 
(0.185) 
 
PrimaryDegree 
0.050 
(0.405) 
0.183 
(0.455) 
Secondary 
0.597** 
(0.280) 
0.881*** 
(0.280) 
 
Secondary 
0.730 
(0.773) 
0.165 
(0.757) 
University 
0.737*** 
(0.256) 
0.633** 
(0.259) 
 
University 
1.081* 
(0.617) 
1.032 
(1.002) 
PriceChange 
-0.928* 
(0.523) 
-1.076 
(1.028) 
 
TravelCost 
-0.084 
(0.418) 
-0.052 
(0.505) 
  
and 
controls 
 
  
and 
controls 
Observations 3762 1552 
 
Observations 2920 1190 
R-Squared .032 .149 
 
R-Squared .010 .124 
F Stat 19.06 16.83 
 
F Stat  2.40 6.52 
!
 
Note: * 90% Confidence, ** 95% Confidence, *** 99% Confidence 
 Standard Error in parentheses 
 Dependent Variables: Log Income!
!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35!
Men Only 
 
Years of Schooling 
                     Table 9: Price Change                                                        Table 10: Travel Cost 
(
! 
" ) YearsOfSchooling* 
PriceChange 
0.572 
(0.384) 
-0.037 
(0.095) 
 (
! 
" ) YearsOfSchooling* 
TravelCost 
-0.046 
(0.034) 
0.038** 
(0.019) 
YearsOfSchooling 
-0.067* 
(0.040) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
 
YearsOfSchooling 
-0.055 
(0.059) 
-0.004 
(0.021) 
PriceChange 
0.404 
(2.275) 
-0.484 
(0.729) 
 
TravelCost 
0.4739 
(0.516) 
-0.451*** 
(0.159) 
  
and 
controls 
   
and 
controls 
Observations 3189 1553  Observations 1883 896 
R-Squared .063 .805  R-Squared .036 .818 
F Stat 6.03 310.39  F Stat 6.43 317.77 
!
!
!
!
Highest Degree Obtained 
                    Table 11: Price Change                                                       Table 12: Travel Cost 
(
! 
"1) PrimaryDegree* 
PriceChange 
2.839* 
(1.669) 
-0.128 
(0.710) 
 (
! 
"1) PrimaryDegree* 
TravelCost 
-0.311 
(0.218) 
0.140 
(0.116) 
(
! 
" 2) SecondaryDegree* 
PriceChange 
8.3518 
(6.688) 
-3.954** 
(1.812) 
 (
! 
" 2) SecondaryDegree* 
TravelCost 
-0.338 
(0.285) 
0.274 
(0.165) 
(
! 
" 3) UniversityDegree* 
PriceChange 
1.409 
(3.842) 
1.743 
(2.690) 
 (
! 
" 3) UniversityDegree* 
TravelCost 
-0.349 
(0.443) 
0.905*** 
(0.262) 
PrimaryDegree 
-0.776*** 
(0.260) 
0.188** 
(0.075) 
 
PrimaryDegree 
-0.467 
(0.357) 
-0.036 
(0.221) 
Secondary 
-0.705** 
(0.333) 
0.546*** 
(0.112) 
 
Secondary 
-0.549 
(0.481) 
0.234 
(0.306) 
University 
-0.027 
(0.378) 
0.692*** 
(0.181) 
 
University 
0.110 
(0.616) 
-0.521 
(0.447) 
PriceChange 
3.057 
(1.959) 
-0.610 
(0.514) 
 
TravelCost 
0.325 
(0.346) 
-0.270*** 
(0.095) 
  
and 
controls 
   
and 
controls 
Observations 3177 1553  Observations 1876 896 
R-Squared .074 .806  R-Squared .034 .820 
F Stat 7.38 269.18  F Stat 2.65 279.61 
 
Note: * 90% Confidence, ** 95% Confidence, *** 99% Confidence 
 Standard Error in parentheses 
 Dependent Variables: Log Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36!
Alternate Analysis 
 
Years of Schooling 
Table 11: Price Change                                                       Table 12: Travel Cost 
(
! 
" ) PriceChange*Sex 36900000 
(93400000) 
106000000 
(153000000) 
 (
! 
" ) TravelCost*Sex 8678115 
(9527580) 
7675768 
(18300000) 
(
! 
" ) YearsOfSchooling* 
PriceChange 
15700000 
(24600000) 
13700000 
(47300000) 
 (
! 
" ) YearsOfSchooling* 
TravelCost 
-228583.6 
(1708645) 
3396711 
(3415540) 
Sex -34400000*** 
(11300000) 
-72900000* 
(36400000) 
 Sex -52500000** 
(21200000) 
-104000000* 
(54400000) 
YearsOfSchooling -552225.8 
(1825460) 
800256.9 
(2567978) 
 YearsOfSchooling 486699.2 
(3923686) 
-2340305 
(5984181) 
PriceChange -147000000 
(134000000) 
-402000000 
(350000000) 
 TravelCost -5527324 
(14100000) 
-56300000 
(41500000) 
  and controls 
 
  and controls 
Observations 6928 3105 
 
Observations 4778 2086 
R-Squared .003 .027 
 
R-Squared .0040 .0296 
F Stat 13.53 4.18 
 
F Stat 4.60 4.33 
!
!
!
!
Highest Degree Obtained 
Table 11: Price Change                                                       Table 12: Travel Cost 
(
! 
" ) PriceChange*Sex 
 
34900000 
(81900000) 
82100000 
(133000000) 
 (
! 
" ) TravelCost*Sex 9010893 
(10100000) 
5033938 
(18300000) 
(
! 
"1) PrimaryDegree* 
PriceChange 
36200000 
(52200000) 
125000000 
(148000000) 
 (
! 
"1) PrimaryDegree* 
TravelCost 
-1638794 
(12400000) 
16800000 
(21200000) 
(
! 
" 2) SecondaryDegree* 
PriceChange 
-186000000 
(1700000000) 
-4430000000 
(4590000000) 
 (
! 
" 2) SecondaryDegree* 
TravelCost 
-31300000 
(26400000) 
-54700000 
(64800000) 
(
! 
" 3) UniversityDegree* 
PriceChange 
834000000 
(684000000) 
4330000000 
(3690000000) 
 (
! 
" 3) UniversityDegree* 
TravelCost 
64900000 
(61000000) 
172000000 
(121000000) 
Sex -33200000*** 
(11000000) 
-72100000* 
(37100000) 
 Sex -53400000** 
(22100000) 
-101000000* 
(54200000) 
PrimaryDegree -17700000 
(13500000) 
5732002 
(23000000) 
 PrimaryDegree -14600000 
(28600000) 
-21100000 
(43300000) 
SecondaryDegree 37100000 
(53400000) 
122000000 
(119000000) 
 SecondaryDegree 80600000 
(107000000) 
238000000 
(222000000) 
UniversityDegree 24000000 
(33500000) 
26800000 
(50700000) 
 UniversityDegree -65200000 
(44000000) 
-87900000 
(80800000) 
PriceChange -59500000 
(128000000) 
-326000000 
(292000000) 
 TravelCost -7800041 
(13200000) 
-37900000 
(33900000) 
  and controls 
 
  and controls 
Observations 6942 3105 
 
Observations 4799 2086 
R-Squared .006 .060 
 
R-Squared .005 .031 
F Stat 49.37 1.83 
 
F Stat 8.06 4.13 
 
Note: * 90% Confidence, ** 95% Confidence, *** 99% Confidence 
 Standard Error in parentheses 
 Dependent Variables: Income!
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